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ABSTRACT 
The relationship between trade and culture has long been a hot 
topic in the debate on the conflicts between free trade and non-trade 
values. The recent case brought by the United States against China 
in the WTO on the measures affecting trading rights and distribution 
services for certain publications and audiovisual entertainment 
products is regarded by many as the latest example of the conflict. 
This article argues, however, that this case is more about the conflict 
between economic liberalization and political control. Applying the 
legal rules under the WTO Agreements and public international law, 
this paper concludes that the United States has built up a very solid 
case and it would be difficult for China to try to defend its measures 
by invoking the exception clauses under the WTO Agreements or 
some other non-WTO agreements, such as the UNESCO Convention 
on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural 
Expressions. Politically, it would be awkward for China to openly 
defend this case in the WTO as well. Given the legal difficulty and 
political sensitivity surrounding the case, China might decide to 
settle the case privately with the United States.  
KEYWORDS: WTO, International Trade, Dispute Settlement, Public 
International Law, Treaty Interpretation, Culture, Political Censorship  
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“True, This! — 
Beneath the rule of men entirely great, 
The pen is mightier than the sword. Behold 
The arch-enchanters wand! — itself a nothing! — 
But taking sorcery from the master-hand 
To paralyse the Cæsars, and to strike 
The loud earth breathless! — Take away the sword — 
States can be saved without it!” 
 
Cardinal Richelieu, Act II, scene II 
in Edward Bulwer-Lytton, Richelieu; Or the Conspiracy: A Play in Five Acts, 
1839 
 
 
“You admire the delightful variety, the inexhaustible riches of nature. You do 
not demand that the rose should smell like the violet, but must the greatest 
riches of all, the spirit, exist in only one variety?... 
Every drop of dew on which the sun shines glistens with an inexhaustible play 
of colours, but the spiritual sun, however many the persons and whatever the 
objects in which it is refracted, must produce only the official colour!” 
 
Karl Marx, Comments on The Latest Prussian Censorship Instruction, 1842 
 
 
 
On April 10, 2007, the United States took the unprecedented move by 
filing two complaints against China in the WTO.1 While there have been a 
lot of discussions on the first complaint, i.e. the case on measures affecting 
the protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights, the second 
                                                        
1 The two cases are China － Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual 
Property Rights, WT/DS362 (Apr 16, 2007) and China － Measures Affecting Trading Rights and 
Distribution Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, 
WT/DS363 (Apr 16, 2007).  
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complaint on the trading rights and distribution rights for publications and 
audiovisual products has received little attention. In the view of the author, 
the second complaint is more interesting as it illustrates the tension 
between trade liberalization and open economy on the one side, and 
political censorship and ideological control on the other side, which is the 
defining feature of Chinese society today. This article starts by analyzing 
the legal bases of the U.S. complaint, and then discusses possible defenses 
China could invoke from WTO agreements and other international 
agreements. It concludes with some prediction on how the case might end. 
I. THE U.S. COMPLAINT 
According to the request for consultations, the U.S. complaint includes 
two claims. The first claim concerns certain measures that restrict trading 
rights with respect to imported films for theatrical release, audiovisual 
home entertainment products (e.g. video cassettes and DVDs), sound 
recordings, and publications (e.g. books, magazines, newspapers, and 
electronic publications). The second claim concerns certain measures that 
restrict market access for, or discriminate against, foreign suppliers of 
distribution services for publications and foreign suppliers of audiovisual 
services (including distribution services) for audiovisual home 
entertainment products. The details of the two claims are discussed as 
follows. 
A. Trading Rights 
Before China’s accession to the WTO, only a limited number of 
Specialized Foreign Trading Companies and some Sino-foreign Joint 
Foreign Trading Companies had trading rights. In addition, some 
manufacturing firms, research institutes and foreign invested enterprises 
have also been granted special approval for exporting their own products 
and importing technologies, equipments, components and raw materials for 
their own production needs. 
During the negotiations leading up to China’s accession to the WTO, 
many Members urged China to remove its restrictions on trading rights, 
which they regarded as barriers to keep foreign products out of the Chinese 
market. After extensive negotiations, China agreed to the following 
commitments with regard to trading rights: 
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China shall progressively liberalize the availability and scope 
of the right to trade, so that, within three years after accession, all 
enterprises in China shall have the right to trade in all goods 
throughout the customs territory of China . . . . Such right to trade 
shall be the right to import and export goods . . . .  
Except as otherwise provided for in this Protocol, all foreign 
individuals and enterprises, including those not invested or 
registered in China, shall be accorded treatment no less 
favourable than that accorded to enterprises in China with respect 
to the right to trade.2 
 
In addition, China has agreed to some further obligations in its 
Working Party Report.3 These include the following: 
First, upon accession, China would eliminate for both Chinese and 
foreign-invested enterprises any export performance, trade balancing, 
foreign exchange balancing and prior experience requirements, such as in 
importing and exporting, as criteria for obtaining or maintaining the right to 
import and export.   
Second, China would reduce the minimum registered capital 
requirement (which applied only to wholly Chinese-invested enterprises) to 
obtain trading rights to Renminbi (RMB) 5,000,000 for year one, RMB 
3,000,000 for year two, RMB 1,000,000 for year three and would eliminate 
the examination and approval system at the end of the phase-in period for 
trading rights. 
Third, beginning one year after accession, joint-venture enterprises 
with minority share foreign-investment would be granted full rights to trade 
and beginning two years after accession, majority share foreign-invested 
joint-ventures would be granted full rights to trade. Within three years after 
accession, all enterprises in China would be granted the right to trade. 
Foreign-invested enterprises would not be required to establish in a 
particular form or as a separate entity to engage in importing and exporting 
nor would a new business license encompassing distribution be required to 
engage in importing and exporting. 
Fourth, trading rights would be granted in a non-discriminatory and 
non-discretionary way. Any requirements for obtaining trading rights would 
be for customs and fiscal purposes only and would not constitute a barrier 
to trade. While foreign enterprises and individuals with trading rights had 
to comply with all WTO-consistent requirements related to importing and 
exporting, such as those concerning import licensing, Technical Barriers to 
                                                        
2 Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China, ¶ 5, WT/L/432, (Nov 23, 2001). 
3 Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China, ¶ 83, 84, WT/ACC/CHN/49, (Oct 1, 
2001) [hereinafter Working Party Report]. 
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Trade (TBT) and Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) measures, requirements 
relating to minimum capital and prior experience would not apply. 
To sum up, China’s commitments on trading rights include the 
following: 
First, eligible persons: trading rights may be granted to all legal 
persons. These include domestic Chinese enterprises, foreign-invested 
enterprises in China, as well as foreign enterprises which are not invested 
or registered in China. In terms of natural persons, the accession 
commitments only grant the rights to trade to foreign natural persons, but 
not domestic natural persons. In other words, under the accession 
commitments, foreign natural persons get “supra-national treatment” that is 
much better than local Chinese individuals. Moreover, foreign individuals 
do not even need to invest or register in China to enjoy the trading rights. 
Second, scope: the right to trade includes both the right to import and 
the right to export goods. It covers all goods, except some products which 
are subject to designated trading exceptions. These goods are listed in 
Annex 2B to China’s Accession Protocol. They include natural rubber, 
timber, plywood, wool, acrylic and steel. Even for these products, however, 
China could not maintain the limitations on trading rights forever. Instead, 
these limitations would need to be phased out within three-years after 
China’s accession to the WTO. 
Third, substantive and formal requirements: upon accession, China 
would eliminate all export performance, trade balancing, foreign exchange 
balancing and prior experience requirements for obtaining or maintaining 
trading rights. Within three years of accession, China would also abolish 
any requirements for foreign-invested enterprises to establish in a particular 
form, as a separate entity or obtain a new business license encompassing 
distribution before they could obtain trading rights. Minimum capital 
requirements would not be applicable to foreign firms or individuals either.  
Fourth, these commitments will be implemented in phases. Within 
three years of accession, trading rights shall be fully liberalized for foreign 
enterprises and individuals. In line with the liberalization, the examination 
and approval system will also be abolished.  
Pursuant to the accession commitments, China revised its Foreign 
Trade Law in 2004. According to Articles 8 and 9 of the new Law, both 
individuals and legal persons can obtain the right to trade. No examination 
or approval from the foreign trade authorities is needed; instead, the foreign 
trade operators only need to register with the relevant authorities. Also, 
they will need to register with the Industry and Commerce Bureau to obtain 
a business license.  
As neither the accession commitments nor the new Foreign Trade Law 
specify any limitations on the right to trade foreign publications and 
audiovisual products, one might think that anyone could freely import these 
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products. A closer look at the relevant laws and regulations of China 
indicates, however, that censorship is far from being washed away by the 
latest waves of trade liberalization.   
The most important regulation on publications in China is the 
Administrative Regulation on Publishing.4 According to Article 41 of the 
Regulation, no entities or individuals may import publications without prior 
approval from the government authorities. Anyone who wishes to establish 
a publication importation entity has to satisfy several requirements, with 
the key requirement being that such entity shall be a wholly-state-owned 
enterprise.5 With regard to the importation of newspapers and periodicals, 
the rules are even stricter: only those designated by the General 
Administration of Press and Publication may carry out such a business.6 
By definition, foreign individuals and enterprises can never become a 
wholly-state-owned enterprise of China. Thus, this Regulation essentially 
denies foreign enterprises the right to import publications into China, and 
this amounts to a violation of China’s obligation under paragraph 5.1 of the 
Accession Protocol to fully liberalize trading rights within three years of 
accession. As this Regulation accords foreign enterprises and individuals 
treatment less favorable than (some) enterprises in China, it also violates 
China’s obligation under paragraph 5.2 of the Accession Protocol and 
paragraph 83 of the Working Party Report to not to discriminate against 
foreign enterprises and individuals. This regulation also re-introduces an 
examination and approval system with regard to the grant of trading rights, 
thus violating China’s commitment under paragraph 83 of the Working 
Party Report to eliminate the examination and approval system at the end 
of the phase-in period. Last but not least, to the extent that the Regulation 
imposes prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges 
for the importation of publications into China, it also violates China's 
obligations under Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994. 
B. Distribution Services 
Even though China has agreed to fully liberalize trading rights in its 
accession commitments, such rights only include the rights to import and 
export and do not automatically give importers the right to distribute within 
China the imported products.7 Instead, foreign service providers may only 
provide distribution services to the extent that commitments have been 
                                                        
4 Chu ban guan li tiao li [Administrative Regulation on Publishing] (promulgated by the State 
Council, Dec 25, 2001, effective Feb 1, 2002).   
5 Id. art. 42.   
6 See id. art. 41.  
7 Working Party Report, supra note 3, ¶ 84.  
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inscribed for such services in China’s Schedule of Specific Commitments. 
China’s commitments for distribution services can be found in several 
sectors of its services schedule, two of which are most relevant here. 
1. Distribution Services for Publications (e.g. Books, Newspapers, 
Periodicals, and Electronic Publications). — In Sector 4 of its services 
schedule, China made commitments on both market access and national 
treatment for the distribution services of publications. With regard to 
market access, China agreed to grant full market access on Mode 3 
(commercial presence) for foreign service suppliers for the retailing of 
books, newspapers and magazines within one year after accession, and for 
the wholesale distribution of books, newspapers and magazines within 
three years after China's accession. With regard to national treatment, China 
also agreed to grant full national treatment for Mode 3 (commercial 
presence) immediately upon accession.  
However, several laws and regulations of China seem to deny or limit 
foreign service suppliers these distribution rights. For example, according 
to Article 4 of Several Opinions of the Ministry of Culture, the State 
Administration of Radio, Film and Television, the General Administration 
of Press and Publication, the National Development and Reform 
Commission and the Ministry of Commerce on Introducing Foreign 
Investment into the Cultural Sector, 8  foreign service suppliers are 
prohibited from engaging in the “master distribution” of publications. The 
word “master distribution” is not defined in the Opinions. Instead, the 
definition is provided in the Administrative Regulations on the Publication 
Market (revised).9 Under this Regulation, distribution services include, 
inter alia, master distribution, wholesale distribution, and retail.10 It further 
defines “master distribution” to mean exclusive distribution of a 
publication to others, while “wholesale distribution” means ordinary 
distribution to other dealers of publication. The key difference between the 
two seems to be the exclusivity for the provider of the “master distribution” 
service, meaning that there is only one distributor in the whole market at 
such a level. Thus, China could well argue that it treats master distribution 
service differently from wholesale distribution service, and the fact that it 
has made commitments on wholesale trade services does not necessarily 
mean that it has also made commitments on master distribution services. 
                                                        
8 Guan yu wen hua ling yu yin jin wai zi de ruo gan yi jian [Several Opinions of the Ministry of 
Culture, State Administration of Radio, Film and Television, General Administration of Press and 
Publication, National Development and Reform Commission and the Ministry of Commerce on 
Introducing Foreign Investment into the Cultural Sector] Order [2005] No. 19 of the Ministry of 
Culture (July 6, 2005). 
9 Chu ban wu shi chang guan li gui ding [Administrative Regulations on the Publication Market 
(revised)] (promulgated by the General Administration of Press & Publication, July 16, 2003, 
revised June 16, 2004) (P.R.C.). 
10 Id. art. 2.  
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This is also confirmed by the Administrative Regulations on Management 
of Foreign-Invested Book, Magazine and Newspaper Distribution 
Enterprises, 11  which only includes wholesaling and retailing in its 
definition of distribution services.12  On the other hand, however, the 
definition of “distribution services,” attached as Annex 2 to China’s GATS 
schedule, points to the other direction. According to the Annex, distribution 
trade services are comprised of four main sub-sectors, i.e. commission 
agent services, wholesaling, retailing and franchising. Of the four, the most 
relevant sub-sector would be wholesaling services, which is defined in the 
same Annex as “the sale of goods/merchandise to retailers to industrial, 
commercial, institutional, or other professional business users, or to other 
wholesalers and related subordinated services.” Thus, the Annex does not 
differentiate between wholesaling services provided on an exclusive basis 
and those provided in competition with other wholesalers at the same level 
of the distribution chain. As the definitions in Annex 2 are made at the 
same time of the specific commitments in China’s services schedule and 
have been referred to in the specific commitments in Sector 4, they should 
be given more weight than the Administrative Regulations on the 
Publication Market (revised) and the Administrative Regulations on 
Management of Foreign-Invested Book, Magazine and Newspaper 
Distribution Enterprises, both of which were introduced only after China’s 
accession to the WTO, if the Panel or Appellate Body were to decide the 
proper scope of China’s commitments on distribution services. Thus, 
China’s prohibition on foreign service suppliers to provide “master 
distribution” for publications is in potential violation of the commitments 
under Sector 4 of its GATS schedule.  
Moreover, under Article 62 of the Administrative Regulations on 
Electronic Publications13, foreign service suppliers cannot even engage in 
the wholesaling of “electronic publications.” As there is no special 
carve-out for distribution services of electronic publications in China’s 
services schedule, China also violates its commitments under Sector 4 of its 
GATS schedule.  
Even in sectors where foreign service suppliers are allowed to provide 
some distribution services, they are subject to higher entry requirements 
than domestic Chinese service suppliers. For example, under the 
Administrative Regulations on Management of Foreign-Invested Book, 
                                                        
11 Wai shang tou zi tu shu, bao zhi, qi kan fen xiao qi ye guan li ban fa [Administrative 
Regulations on Management of Foreign-Invested Book, Magazine and Newspaper Distribution 
Enterprises] (promulgated by the General Administration of Press and Publication & the Ministry 
of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, Mar 17, 2003, effective May 1, 2003) (P.R.C). 
12 Id. art. 2.  
13 Dian zi chu ban wu guan li gui ding [Administrative Regulations on Electronic Publications] 
(promulgated by the General Administration of Press & Publication, Dec 30, 1997, effective Dec 
30, 1997) (P.R.C). 
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Magazine and Newspaper Distribution Enterprises, foreign service 
suppliers of publication distribution services need a minimum registered 
capital of 30 million RMB for providing wholesaling services and five 
million RMB for providing retailing services,14 while domestic service 
suppliers only need two million RMB in registered capital to provide 
wholesaling service and are not subject to minimum capital requirement for 
retailing services.15 In addition, foreign service suppliers need to have a 
minimum prior operating history of 30 years before they could be granted 
the right to provide wholesaling or retailing services,16 while the domestic 
service suppliers are not subject to any prior experience requirement at all. 
Furthermore, even for foreign service suppliers who managed to get over 
these barriers and have successfully obtained the right to provide 
distribution services, their rights might be curtailed if they are suspected of 
trying to sneak into propaganda businesses such as radio and television 
channels and frequencies, newspaper and journal space, or editing and 
publication.17 
As these restrictions do not fall within the terms, limitations, conditions, 
or qualifications on market access or national treatment that China has 
specified in its Schedule for the distribution of publications through 
commercial presence in China by service suppliers of other Members, they 
are inconsistent with China’s obligations under Articles XVI and XVII of 
the GATS. 
2. Audiovisual Home Entertainment Products. — China’s commitment 
for audiovisual services is scheduled under Sector 2D of the services 
schedule. For National Treatment, China undertook to accord full national 
treatment for Mode 3 upon accession. For Market Access, China’s 
commitment under the Mode 3 reads as follows, “[u]pon accession, foreign 
services suppliers will be permitted to establish contractual joint ventures 
with Chinese partners to engage in the distribution of audiovisual products, 
excluding motion pictures, without prejudice to China’s right to examine 
the content of audio and video products (see footnote 1).” 
This seems to indicate that the only limitation is related to the types of 
joint venture through which the service may be supplied, without any cap 
on foreign equity participation. This is confirmed by the explanation in 
footnote 1, which states that “[t]he terms of the contract, concluded in 
accordance with China's laws, regulations and other measures, establishing 
a ‘contractual joint venture’ govern matters such as the manner of operation 
and management of the joint venture as well as the investment or other 
contributions of the joint venture parties. Equity participation by all parties 
                                                        
14 Wai shang tou zi tu shu, bao zhi, qi kan fen xiao qi ye guan li ban fa, supra note 11, arts. 7 & 8.  
15 Chu ban wu shi chang guan li gui ding, supra note 9, art. 8.  
16 Wai shang tou zi tu shu, bao zhi, qi kan fen xiao qi ye guan li ban fa , supra note 11, arts. 7 & 8.   
17 Guan yu wen hua ling yu yin jin wai zi de ruo gan yi jian, supra note 8, art. 4.  
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to the contractual joint venture is not required, but is determined pursuant 
to the joint venture contract.” 
Again, however, the laws and regulations of China have placed further 
restrictions upon the ability of foreign service suppliers to provide 
distribution services on audiovisual products. First, the prohibition on 
foreign service suppliers to engage in “master distribution” services applies 
to audiovisual products as well as publications.18 Second, for Sino-foreign 
contractual joint venture enterprises specializing in the wholesaling and 
retailing of audiovisual products, the Chinese partner must have a dominant 
position,19 which means that the interests of the Chinese partner in the joint 
venture shall be no less than 51%.20 Neither of these restrictions fall within 
the terms, limitations, conditions, or qualifications on market access or 
national treatment that China has specified in its Schedule for the 
distribution of such products through commercial presence in China by 
service suppliers of other Members, thus they are inconsistent with China's 
obligations under Articles XVI and XVII of the GATS. 
II. POSSIBLE DEFENSES FOR CHINA 
As illustrated above, the U.S. complaint seems to be pretty 
straightforward and there is not much room for China to argue with regard 
to the legal merits of the claims raised by the United States. In the view of 
the author, the only defenses available for China would be the general 
exception clause contained in Article XX of the GATT and Article XIV of 
the GATS, as well as the UNESCO Convention on the Protection and 
Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions. 
A. The General Exceptions Clauses 
As the claims of the United States on trading rights and distribution 
services are based on the GATT and GATS, respectively, China would have 
to justify its measures under both the GATT and GATS. Each of the two 
agreements includes its own general exceptions clauses, which are worded 
similarly. In the author’s view, China might wish to invoke the following 
                                                        
18 Id.  
19 See id. art. 1.  
20 Zhong wai he zuo yin xiang zhi pin fen xiao qi ye guan li ban fa [Measures for Administration 
of Chinese Foreign Contractual Distribution Ventures of Audiovisual Products] (promulgated by 
the Ministry of Culture and the Ministry of Commerce, effective Jan 1, 2002), art. 8.4 (P.R.C.). 
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three exceptions: 
1. Protection of Public Morals. — According to Article XX(a) of the 
GATT, GATT-inconsistent measures might be allowed if they are 
“necessary to protect public morals.” Article XIV(a) of the GATS also 
includes a similar exception for measures “necessary to protect public 
morals or to maintain public order.” So far, GATT and WTO panels have 
not had an opportunity to examine the meaning of this exception in the 
context of the GATT. In the US-Gambling case, however, the WTO Panel 
had to deal with the meaning of this exception in the GATS context for the 
very first time. As stated by Appellate Body in EC － Bananas III, the 
jurisprudence under GATT 1994 could be relevant for the interpretation of 
analogous provisions contained in the GATS.21 Vice versa, the analysis for 
the similar provisions under the GATS must be relevant for the 
interpretation of similar provisions under the GATT. Thus, we will use the 
Panel’s reasoning in the Gambling case as guidance for the public morals 
exception under both the GATT and GATS. 
Citing to the Appellate Body’s ruling in U.S. － Wool Shirts and 
Blouses, the Panel stated that a party seeking to invoke Article XIV of the 
GATS bears the burden of proof to demonstrate that the various elements 
comprising a defense under this Article have been fulfilled.22 Thus, in this 
case, China would have to prove that its measures are justified under GATS 
Article XIV(a). According to the Panel, once the defending party invoking 
the exception has made a prima facie demonstration that a measure fulfills 
the requirements of Article XIV, in the absence of “effective refutation” by 
the complaining party, a panel must rule, as a matter of law, in favor of the 
defending party.23   
Moving forward to set the substantial legal standard applicable, the 
Panel noted that a Member invoking Article XIV(a) must demonstrate two 
elements, namely: “(a) the measure must be one designed to ‘protect public 
morals’ or to ‘maintain public order’; and (b) the measure for which 
justification is claimed must be ‘necessary’ to protect public morals or to 
maintain public order.”24 
Citing to the definition found in the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 
the Panel interpreted the term “public moral” to mean “standards of right 
and wrong conduct maintained by or on behalf of a community or 
nation.”25 As to the “public order” exception, the original text includes a 
                                                        
21 Appellate Body Report, European Commission － Regime for the Importation, Sale and 
Distribution of Bananas, ¶ 231, WT/DS27/AB/R (Sep 9, 1997).  
22 Panel Report, United States － Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and 
Betting Services, ¶ 6.450, WT/DS285/R (Nov 10, 2004) [hereinafter U.S. － Gambling]. 
23 Id. ¶ 6.451. 
24 Id. ¶ 6.455. 
25 Id. ¶ 6.463-465. 
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footnote, which states that “[t]he public order exception may be invoked 
only where a genuine and sufficiently serious threat is posed to one of the 
fundamental interests of society.” This note, read together with the 
dictionary meaning of the term, suggests that “public order” refers to the 
preservation of the fundamental interests of a society, as reflected in public 
policy and law.26 Thus, the Panel concludes that “public morals” and 
“public order” are two distinct concepts under Article XIV(a) of the 
GATS.27 At the same time, there is also some overlap between the two as 
both concepts seek to protect largely similar values.28 For example, the 
fundamental interests under the “public order” exception can relate, inter 
alia, to standards of morality, which is also within the domain of the “public 
morals” exception. 
As the Panel stated in the Gambling case, it was unnecessary in that 
case to determine which exception the U.S. measures fall under as it was 
enough that the U.S. measures fall under one of them.29 In the current case, 
however, this is not the case at least with regard to the first claim of the 
United States. As the U.S. claim on trading rights was based on the GATT 
and GATT Article XX(a) only made reference to the public morals 
exception but not the public order exception, China’s measures cannot be 
justified unless it satisfies the requirements under the public morals 
exception.  
Turning back to the definition of “public moral” as “standards of right 
and wrong conduct maintained by or on behalf of a community or nation,” 
it is easy to understand that such standards could be maintained for 
religious purposes. For example, when it acceded to the WTO, Saudi 
Arabia invoked GATT Article XX(a) to ban imports of pork, frog meat, 
alcoholic drinks, mummified animals, and foodstuff containing animal 
blood in their manufacturing.30 Apparently, these restrictions are made 
pursuant to the teachings of the Holy Quran. Similarly, as observed by the 
Panel in the Gambling case, the “public moral” exception can be used to 
justify measures prohibiting the importation of “[t]ickets or publicity items 
for lottery or gambling” or the supply of gambling services.31 Along the 
same line, Peter Van den Bossche also argued that the same exception 
might be used to justify prohibition of “cultural goods with specific 
characteristics, such as foreign X-rated movies, music CDs containing 
                                                        
26 Id. ¶ 6.467. 
27 Id. ¶ 6.468. 
28 Id.  
29 Id. ¶ 6.469. 
30 Report of the Working Party on the Accession of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to the World 
Trade Organization, Annex F: List of Banned Imports, WT/ACC/SAU/61 (Nov 1, 2005). 
31 U.S. － Gambling, supra note 22, ¶ 6.471-472.  
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songs with racist lyrics or books denying the Holocaust.”32 As most 
countries in the world share condemnation of these products, it is less 
controversial to invoke the “public morals” exception to justify these 
measures.  
Problems arise, however, when countries disagree with each other as to 
whether or not certain items should be banned. For example, can we extend 
the same reasoning to products of child labor, or foodstuff made of 
genetically-modified organisms (GMOs)? The issue is even more difficult 
when one deals with products which are beloved in one country but could 
subject you to criminal penalty in another. For example, in Korea, dog meat 
is a staple food, while in Hong Kong, anyone found selling flesh of dogs as 
food or eating dogs may be punishable by imprisonment.33 Recognizing 
the difference between the cultures and histories of different Members, the 
Panel generally allows some discretion for the Members invoking the 
exception, subject to the requirement that such discretion shall be kept in 
balance by the duty of that same Member to respect the treaty rights of 
other Members.34 The question is, though, where shall we draw the line? In 
its accession package, Saudi Arabia invoked Article XX(a) to prohibit the 
importation of the Holy Quran. If that is permissible on religious grounds 
for a country that is predominantly Muslim, shall we allow another country 
to do the same even though they do not have a dominant religion? Extend 
the logic a bit further, shall the same leeway be accorded to a Member that 
is invoking the exception to prohibit the importation of foreign books, 
periodicals and movies so that its people would not be corrupted by 
“Capitalist Liberalism thoughts”? In the view of the author, the answer to 
the last two questions lies primarily in whether or not such restrictions are 
supported by “standards of right and wrong conduct maintained by or on 
behalf of a community or nation”.  
To answer this question, we need to turn to several worth-noting points 
in the interpretation of “public moral” by the US – Gambling Panel. First, 
the standard is that of “a community or nation”, rather than that of the 
government, not to mention that of a particular political party. Second, even 
if we use the standard of a nation, this is not exactly the same as that of a 
political State. This is confirmed by the definition in the Shorter Oxford 
English Dictionary, which defines the word “nation” as, inter alia, “[a] 
large aggregate of people so closely associated with each other by factors 
such as common descent, language, culture, history, and occupation of the 
                                                        
32  Peter Van den Bossche, Free Trade and Culture: A Study of Relevant WTO Rules and 
Constraints on National Cultural Policy Measures, MAASTRICHT FACULTY OF LAW WORKING 
PAPERS 2007, at 60. 
33 Dogs and Cats Regulations, Cap 167A, Regs. 22 & 23. In December 2006, for example, four 
individuals were imprisoned for 30 days for slaughtering and eating dog in Hong Kong. See 
http://hk.sznews.com/20061223/ca2538387.htm.   
34 U.S. － Gambling, supra note 22, ¶ 6.452.  
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same territory as to be identified as a distinct people, esp. when organized 
or potentially organizable as a political State” (emphasis added). Thus, the 
defining feature of a “nation” is their common descent, language, culture, 
history, and occupation of the same territory, rather than the current or 
potentially organization as a political State. This is well illustrated by the 
recent recognition, for example, of Quebec to be a “nation” by the federal 
government of Canada,35 even though people from Quebec still carry 
Canadian passports when they travel. Third, the standard is one of “right or 
wrong”, not of “legal or illegal”. Thus, while government laws and 
regulations can be taken as an indicator of such standard, the fact that a 
particular standard has not made its way into formal legislation does not 
necessarily mean that such standard is not the one held by “a community or 
nation”. Vice versa, the mere fact that such standard happens to be the one 
adopted in the laws and regulations of a country does not automatically 
elevate it to the status of a standard held by “a community or nation”. 
Starting with the persecution of Christians by the Roman emperors, there 
have been many examples in history where the standard of right or wrong 
for “a community or nation” is not exactly the one forced by the 
government upon its people, or sometimes even the exact opposite of the 
one adopted by the ruling class. In such cases, should the standard set by 
the government, which might soon be overthrown, be taken as the one held 
by the “community or nation”, which have been there, and will be there, for 
much longer period of time? 
Returning to the specifics of the case, it is doubtful that the restrictions 
on trading rights and distribution services could be justified as one that is 
dictated by the need to uphold the “standards of right and wrong conduct 
maintained by or on behalf of a community or nation”. Save for a few 
publications such as pornographic or racist publications, most Chinese 
would love to get access to foreign movies, newspapers, and books. If there 
weren’t such demand, vendors of pirated copies of “The Lives of Others”,36 
unauthorized publishers of “Past Stories of Peking Opera Stars” by Zhang 
Yihe,37 and online distributors of tutorials on how to get around the Great 
Firewall of China would have long disappeared: it would have been much 
more profitable and less risky for them to go into other businesses.   
Moreover, should the Panel decide to allow China to invoke Article 
                                                        
35See CBC News, Quebecers form a nation within Canada: PM, available at http://www.cbc.ca/ 
canada/story/2006/11/22/harper-quebec.html. 
36 The Lives of Others [Das Leben der Anderen] (2006) is a movie about the surveillance system 
installed by the former Eastern Germany Government to control and eliminate political dissidents. 
Winner of the 2007 Oscar Best Foreign Language Film of the Year and another fifty prestigious 
awards and nominations, it has been banned in China. See http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0405094/.  
37 Past Stories of Peking Opera Stars tells the stories of famous Chinese Peking Opera stars after 
the Communists took power in 1949. It has been banned in China. See South China Morning Post, 
Eight Books Banned in Crackdown on Dissent, Jan 19, 2007, EDT6.  
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XX(a) in this case, this would amount to granting a license to violate some 
core international human rights standards, the most important one of which 
being the right to freedom of expression, which, as defined in the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), includes 
“freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, 
regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, 
or through any other media of his choice.”38 This would no doubt be even 
more damaging to the reputation of the WTO panels than the accusations 
that they kill turtles and dolphins or legitimize gambling. 
Another possible ground for justification for the restrictions on 
distribution services supplied by foreign service providers is the “public 
order” exception under GATS Article XIV(a). Again, however, it would be 
very hard to conceive how “a genuine and sufficiently serious threat” could 
be “posed to one of the fundamental interests of society” merely by 
allowing foreign distributors to engage in the master distribution business 
of publications that have been imported into China after going through 
censorship. Moreover, even if there were to be any threat, that would be 
threat to the interests of the Communist Party rather than the society, or 
anyone else for that matter. 
Even if assuming, arguendo, that the measures under challenge could 
be justified as measures taken for the purpose of protecting the public 
moral or the public order, it would be very hard to justify the necessity of 
such measures. Citing to the Appellate Body decision in Korea – Various 
Measures on Beef, the Panel held in U.S.-Gambling that the term 
“necessary” refers to “a range of degrees of necessity . . . a ‘necessary’ 
measure is, in this continuum, located significantly closer to the pole of 
‘indispensable’ than to the opposite pole of simply ‘making a contribution 
to’”. 39  In determining whether or not a measure is “necessary”, a 
“weighing and balancing” test has to be applied.40 This includes the 
following components: 
(a) The importance of interests or values that the challenged 
measure is intended to protect;  
(b) The extent to which the challenged measure contributes to the 
realization of the end pursued by that measure;  
(c) The trade impact of the challenged measure.   
Applying this test to the current case, we can reach the following 
conclusions: 
First, as noted above, the interests that the challenged measures are 
supposed to protect are not those of the community or the society. Thus, the 
importance of the interests is very low or even non-existent. 
                                                        
38 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 19, Dec 16, 1966, O.H.C.H.R.  
39 U.S －  Gambling, supra note 22, ¶ 6.475. 
40 Id, ¶ 6.476. 
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Second, as the measures are not designed to protect the interests of the 
community or the society, they contribute little to the protection of the 
interests recognized by the public moral exception. 
Third, even if assuming, arguendo, that the measures do serve to 
protect community and society interests, what would be the trade impact of 
such measures? As stated by the Appellate Body in Korea – Various 
Measures on Beef, in assessing the trade impact, the Panel should consider 
whether there are WTO compatible alternatives that could be adopted by 
the Member before resorting to WTO-inconsistent alternatives.41 One thing 
worth noting in this case is that the measures target not the products, but the 
persons who may import or distribute such products. On the other hand, as 
discussed above, the focus of the censorship is on foreign culture products 
only. In the view of the author, this means that China could well have taken 
a less-inconsistent alternative by restricting the importation and distribution 
of the products rather than differentiating on who are authorized to import 
or distribute them. Such limitation can be effectuated by a ban, or, short of 
this, an examination (censorship) scheme that reviews the content of the 
publication before it might be imported or distributed. So long as such 
measure is applied equally against both imported and domestic publications, 
there would have been no inconsistency with WTO rules. To put it in 
another way, the key is, as explained by the Panel in U.S. - Gambling, 
whether or not the challenged measure serves to address some specific 
concerns with regard to the identity of the persons who might be authorized 
to import or distribute the publications.42 The answer is none: the focus is 
on products rather than the persons who might deal in such products.  
After identifying and evaluating the elements of the necessity test, we 
must also “weigh and balance” these elements. As explained above, the 
interests to be protected by the measures are not those recognized by the 
exceptions, while the measures taken to protect such interests could well 
have been replaced by some less trade-restrictive alternatives. Thus, the 
measures probably would not pass the “weighing and balancing” test either.  
2. Securing Compliance with WTO-Consistent National Laws. — This 
exception can be found, respectively, under GATT Article XX(d) and 
GATS Article XIV(c), which states that “nothing in this Agreement shall be 
construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting  
party of measures” “necessary to secure compliance with laws or 
regulations which are not inconsistent with the provisions of this 
Agreement”. As stated by the Panel in U.S. - Gambling, in determining 
whether a challenged measure is provisionally justified under this 
                                                        
41 Appellate Body Report, Korea － Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen 
Beef, ¶ 165, WT/DS161/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R (Dec 11, 2000).   
42 U.S － Gambling, supra note 22, ¶ 6.521. 
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exception, three elements must be demonstrated by the Member who 
invokes it, namely: 
(a) the measure for which justification is claimed must “secure 
compliance” with other laws or regulations; 
(b) those other “laws or regulations” must not be inconsistent with 
the WTO Agreement; and 
(c) the measure for which justification is claimed must be 
“necessary” to secure compliance with those other laws or regulations.43    
Citing the Panel report in EEC – Parts and Components, the Panel 
noted in U.S.－Gambling that the first element is meant “to enforce 
obligations under laws and regulations” rather than “to ensure the 
attainment of the objectives of the laws and regulations.”44 Also, the Panel 
noted that, in terms of the degree to which a measure must “secure 
compliance” with obligations under other laws and regulations, a measure 
need not be designed exclusively to “secure compliance” with the justifying 
law.45 Instead, it was sufficient if a measure was put in place, at least in 
part, in order to secure compliance with the justifying legislation.46 
For the second element, Article XIV(c) provides a non-exhaustive list 
of laws or regulations “which are not inconsistent with the provisions of 
this Agreement,” which includes laws and regulations for the prevention of 
deceptive and fraudulent practices or to deal with the effects of a default on 
services contracts; the protection of the privacy of individuals in relation to 
the processing and dissemination of personal data; and the protection of 
confidentiality of individual records and accounts; and safety. According to 
the U.S.－Gambling Panel, laws and regulations other than those that fall 
within the list may also be relied upon in justifying a measure under this 
exception provided that those other laws and regulations are 
WTO-consistent.47 
Regarding the third element, the same “weighing and balancing” test as 
mentioned above would also apply.  
In the current case, the second element should be easy to satisfy as 
there are many laws and regulations in China effectuating censorship and, 
obnoxious as they might be, they probably do not violate any obligations 
under the WTO. The problem, however, is whether or not the measures 
taken by China restricting importation and distribution of publications by 
foreign persons are meant to enforce the obligations under such laws, and, 
even if this could be proved, whether such measures are necessary. As 
explained above, it would be very hard for China to prove either element as 
                                                        
43 Id. ¶ 6.536.  
44 Id. ¶ 6.538.  
45 Id. ¶ 6.539.  
46 Id. 
47 Id. ¶ 6.540.  
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the measures target not products but persons who might deal in such 
products. Thus, they are probably not meant to “enforce” the censorship 
rules, nor are they necessary for such purposes.     
3. Protection of National Treasure. — Under GATT Article XX(f), 
Members are also allowed to introduce measures “imposed for the 
protection of national treasures of artistic, historic or archaeological value”. 
While arguments can be made that this exception applies to both tangible 
cultural property and intangible cultural heritage, 48  there are several 
elements that are difficult to satisfy in this case. First, the measures at issue 
shall relate to the national treasures of the Member applying such measure. 
In the current case, the restriction on trading rights applies to imports only, 
which means that it relates primarily to foreign publications rather than 
domestic ones. Second, the measures shall be taken to protect such national 
treasures. Again, it is unclear how the prohibition on foreign firms to 
import foreign publications and movies could affect the protection of 
national treasures of China.  
4. The Requirements under the Chapeau. — As the determination of 
what constitutes “public moral” is a highly political issue, the Panel 
probably would not wish to be dragged into the messy business of having 
to rule on the legitimacy of China’s censorship regime. Instead, the Panel 
might wish to avoid this issue and choose to strike down the Chinese 
measure on the technical point of inconsistency with the requirements 
under the chapeau, which reads as follows: 
 
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied 
in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where like 
conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on trade in services, 
nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the 
adoption or enforcement by any Member of measures.49 
 
As stated by the Appellate Body on several occasions, “[t]he chapeau 
by its express terms addresses, not so much the questioned measure or its 
specific contents as such, but rather the manner in which that measure is 
applied.”50 Thus, “a balance must be struck between the right of a Member 
                                                        
48 Compare Chi Carmody, When “Cultural Identity was not at Issue”: Thinking about Canada - 
Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, 30(2) LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 231, 256 (1999) and 
Anke Dahrendorf, Trade meets Culture: The Legal Relationship between WTO rules and the 
UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, 
MAASTRICHT FACULTY OF LAW WORKING PAPER 2006, at 33-34. 
49 General Agreement on Trade in Services, Article XIV. Article XX of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade 1994 has similar languages. 
50  Appellate Body Report, United States －  Standards for Reformulated and Conventional 
Gasoline, at 22, WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr 29, 1996). 
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to invoke an exception under Article XX and the duty of that same Member 
to respect the treaty rights of the other Members.”51 In order to maintain 
the balance, the Member invoking the exception shall make sure that the 
application of the trade restrictive measure does not constitute an “arbitrary 
or unjustifiable discrimination” between countries where the same 
conditions prevail or a “disguised restriction” on international trade. 
Summarizing from the case law, Van den Bossche noted that a Member that 
wants to justify an otherwise GATT-inconsistent measure relating to 
cultural goods may have to show the following: 
(a)  that it has made serious, good faith efforts to negotiate a 
multilateral solution to the problem that the GATT-inconsistent measure is 
said to address;  
(b) that the otherwise GATT-inconsistent measure has been applied 
with due regard to the different conditions between countries and is not 
applied in a rigid and inflexible manner; and  
(c) the design of the measure does not reveal that protectionist 
objectives are pursued.52 
In the current case, even though China probably does not have 
protectionist objectives in mind when it formulated the policy, it would be 
very hard for China to satisfy the first two requirements as China surely 
have not tried to negotiate with the United States to work out a 
GATT(S)-consistent measure, nor is there any allowance to account for the 
different conditions between countries so that it would be possible for firms 
from a country to obtain permission under certain circumstances. Thus, 
China’s measures probably do not satisfy the requirements under the 
chapeau. 
B. UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the 
Diversity of Cultural Expressions 
China may also try to justify its measure under the newly-concluded 
UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of 
Cultural Expressions (the “Convention”), which affirms the “sovereign 
right” of countries to “formulate and implement their cultural policies and 
to adopt measures to protect and promote the diversity of cultural 
expressions.”53 
However, before China can use the Convention as defense, several 
                                                        
51 Appellate Body Report, United States － Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
Products, ¶ 156, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct 12, 1998) 
52 Van den Bossche, supra note 32, at 62.  
53 UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, 
Oct. 20, 2005, arts. 5 & 6.   
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legal hurdles must first be overcome: 
1. Can the Convention Be Invoked in WTO Dispute Settlement As A 
Defense? — It is generally agreed that the DSU limits the jurisdiction of 
the Panel to claims brought under WTO covered agreements. 54  The 
question, however, is whether in examining such claims, non-WTO law can 
be used as a defense or justification for violation of WTO law. According to 
Pauwelyn, “the fact that the substantive jurisdiction of WTO panels is 
limited to claims under WTO covered agreements does not mean that the 
applicable law available to a WTO panel is necessarily limited to WTO 
covered agreements.”55 In support of his theory, he offered the following 
reasons: 
First, WTO Panels and the Appellate Body have not limited themselves 
to the four corners of WTO covered agreements: they have referred to 
general principles of law and customary international law. 56  Thus, 
non-WTO law can be applied in WTO proceedings as well. The author 
wishes to point out, however, the reference to general principles of law and 
customary international law or even the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
the Treaties by the Panel and the Appellate Body is made exactly pursuant 
to the mandate within “the four corners of WTO covered agreements”: 
Under Article 3.2 of the DSU, one of the functions of the dispute settlement 
system, as well as the duties of the Panel and the Appellate Body, is “to 
clarify the existing provisions of those agreements in accordance with 
customary rules of interpretation of public international law.” Moreover, 
the mere fact that panels and the Appellate Body have referred to rules of 
interpretation to help clarify the meanings of the substantive obligations in 
the covered agreements does not necessarily mean that panels and the 
Appellate Body can refer to other non-WTO rules to change the substantive 
obligations under the WTO covered agreements. Before one can reach such 
a conclusion, a quantum leap is needed.  
Second, among the “customary rules of interpretation of public 
international law” referred to in DSU Article 3.2 is Article 31(3) of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which states that the treaty 
interpreter shall take into account not only of the treaty itself, but also of 
“any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation 
of the treaty or the application of its provisions,” as well as “any relevant 
rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties.”57 
                                                        
54 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Dispute, art. 1.1. See also 
Joost Pauwelyn, How to Win a WTO Dispute Based on Non-WTO Law: Questions of Jurisdiction 
and Merits, 37 J. W. T. 997, 1000 (2003).  
55 Joost Pauwelyn, The Role of Public International Law in the WTO: How Far Can We Go? 95 
AM. J. INT’L L. 535, 560 (2001).  
56 Pauwelyn, supra note 54, at 1001. 
57 Id.  
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Thus, non-WTO law shall be applied in WTO cases. In the author’s view, 
however, this is another misreading of the rules. First of all, while Article 
31 states that a treaty shall be interpreted “in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty,” the “subsequent agreement” 
and “relevant rules of international law” are only to be “taken into account, 
together with the context” (emphasis added). This means that, while the 
terms of the treaty at issue shall be directly applied, the other relevant 
agreements and rules shall only be used to supplement the interpretation 
based on the context and may not be applied directly. Second, the scope of 
such agreements is not as expansive as Pauwelyn have suggested. They are 
limited only to agreements made between the same parties regarding 
specifically the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its 
provisions, or rules which are relevant and applies to the relations between 
the parties. In the current case, the Convention apparently was not made to 
interpret the WTO agreements or its provisions; nor is it really relevant to 
the trade relations between the Members as it mainly concerns the 
protection of cultural diversity, a concept not found in WTO agreements.  
Thus, it should not be applicable.  
Third, the WTO agreement is a treaty part of public international law. 
Thus, “even without the explicit confirmation in DSU Article 3.2, the WTO 
agreement cannot . . . be applied in isolation from other rules of 
international law.”58 To illustrate his point, Pauwelyn draws an analogy 
between contract law and international law:59 
 
Just as private contracts are automatically born into a system of 
domestic law, so treaties are automatically born into the system of 
international law. Much the way private contracts do not need to 
list all the relevant legislative and administrative provisions of 
domestic law for them to be applicable to the contract, so treaties 
need not explicitly set out rules of general international law for 
them to be applicable to the treaty. 
 
Again, however, this argument suffers from many obvious errors. First, 
contrary to what is argued by Pauwelyn, the key reason behind parties’ 
decision to enter into private contracts is not because they want to 
incorporate the provisions in the contract laws, but because they want to 
opt out the default rules that would be applicable absent explicit provisions 
in each individual contract. Thus, to say that general international law 
applies even when the WTO members have decided to establish some 
specific rights and obligations in the covered agreements defeats the whole 
purpose of taking the trouble to negotiate WTO agreements. Second, even 
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if assuming general rules of international law apply, because WTO rules, at 
least compared to such general rules, are special rules and rules concluded 
later in time, thus, according to the general rules of international law such 
as lex posterior derogat legi priori and lex specialis derogat generali, WTO 
rules should still prevail. 
Fourth, while Pauwelyn recognizes that Article 3.2 specifies that the 
WTO panel or the Appellate Body cannot “change” the WTO treaty, he 
argues that this does not limit the extent to which WTO Members may 
conclude or have concluded other treaties that can influence their mutual 
WTO rights and obligations.60 Thus, Pauwelyn concludes,  
 
As important as the distinction is between Panel jurisdiction 
(WTO claims only) and applicable law (potentially all 
international law), so too is the distinction between interpreting 
WTO rules (and the prohibition to add or detract from those rules 
in the process) and examining WTO claims in the context of 
other applicable international law (where the expression of state 
consent and conflict rules of international law must decide the 
outcome).61 
 
As Pauwelyn does not provide further illustration on this point in his 
article, it is unclear as to what exactly he means by this part. Trying to 
make some sense out of this, the author thinks that his argument can be 
re-phrased as follows:  
 
Even though the Panel and the Appellate Body have no power to 
change the rights and obligations of the Members, the Members 
themselves can always conclude other treaties (outside of the 
WTO framework) to change their rights and obligations under the 
WTO. To give effect to these (non-WTO) treaties, the panel and 
the Appellate Body shall have the power to apply them in WTO 
disputes as well. Otherwise, the power of Members to conclude 
other treaties would be diminished.  
 
In the view of the author, Pauwelyn fails to discuss two key questions 
that naturally follow from his theory: Why would the WTO Members want 
to conclude something outside of the WTO framework? How should we 
deal with such non-WTO treaties in WTO dispute settlement if Members 
intentionally choose not to conclude them within the WTO framework? The 
answers are very obvious. The WTO is equipped with two powerful 
                                                        
60 Id., at 1002-03. 
61 Id., at 1003.  
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features which one can not find in most other international agreements: 
single undertaking and a binding dispute settlement system. The 
combination of these two features means that any multilateral agreement 
concluded within the WTO framework would automatically be enforceable 
through the semi-automatic dispute settlement procedures. Thus, when 
Members had the choice of concluding some agreements within the WTO 
framework but declined from doing so, they probably never intended to 
make such agreement enforceable through the WTO dispute settlement 
system. If, however, the panel follows Pauwelyn’s advice and decides to 
drag a Member into a formal WTO dispute settlement proceeding, that is 
clearly an infringement upon the sovereign rights of such Member, which 
all along has never intended to be held responsible in WTO for breach of 
obligations under these non-WTO treaties! 
In summary, the Convention, just like the other non-WTO agreements, 
probably should not be allowed to be invoked as a defense in WTO cases.  
2. Conditions for Invocation as A Defense. — Even if assuming, 
arguendo, that somehow the WTO panel and the Appellate Body can apply 
non-WTO agreements in WTO disputes, there are several conditions that 
such non-WTO agreements need to satisfy before it could be invoked. First, 
the two agreements must regulate the same subject matter. If they deal with 
different subject matters, apparently there would be no need to reconcile 
the two. Second, the two agreements must impose mutually exclusive 
obligations. If the obligations under both agreements could be met by the 
same measure, there would be no conflict between them and one cannot be 
used to justify a breach of the other. Third, both parties to the dispute must 
also be parties to both agreements.  
In this case, while some (rather weak) arguments can be made for the 
first two conditions, it would be impossible for China to satisfy the third 
condition as the United States has strong opposition to the Convention and 
has not joined the Convention so far. Thus, the treaty to which both States 
are parties, i.e. the WTO Agreements, shall govern their mutual rights and 
obligations.62  
3. Conflict Rules Applicable. — Assuming, arguendo, that the 
Convention satisfies the requirements above and could be invoked as a 
defense, which rules shall we apply to resolve the conflict between the two 
treaties? Of the many rules of treaty interpretation, two rules, i.e., lex 
posterior derogat legi priori and lex specialis derogat generali seems to be 
most relevant. Here again arguments can be made on both sides. First, it 
might appear that the Convention is lex posterior as it was only concluded 
in 2005, or ten years after the WTO agreements were concluded. However, 
as the GATS includes as its integral part the schedules of specific 
                                                        
62 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 30, May 23, 1969, 331 U.N.T.S.1155.   
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commitments of Members and these are subject to revisions during the 
ongoing Doha Round, one could also argue that the GATS obligations are 
lex posterior. Second, as the GATT and GATS provide disciplines on all 
goods and service sectors while the Convention only deals with culture 
goods and services, it seems logical to conclude that the Convention is lex 
specialis. On the other hand, as the GATS is based on a positive-listing 
approach and the obligations for each Member depends on their own 
schedule, even with regard to cultural services, the obligations for each 
Member is very different. Thus, we can also argue that the GATS 
obligations are lex specialis.  
Most importantly, the Convention has explicitly provided that 
“[n]othing in this Convention shall be interpreted as modifying rights and 
obligations of the Parties under any other treaties to which they are 
parties.”63 This seems to suggest that the Convention shall defer to other 
international treaties in cases of conflict. 
In summary, the Convention does not necessarily prevail over the WTO 
agreements obligations even applying the conflict rules under general 
international law. 
4. Limitations in the Convention Itself. — The Convention also includes 
several limitations which suggest that it might not be applicable to this 
dispute. First, as most of the provisions in the Convention use “best 
endeavor” language, one might argue that the Parties to the Convention do 
not really want to create binding obligations as the ones found in WTO 
agreements. Second, in Article 2.1, the Convention has explicitly provided 
that it shall not be used to justify human rights violations by stating the 
following: 
 
Cultural diversity can be protected and promoted only if human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, such as freedom of expression, 
information and communication, as well as the ability of 
individuals to choose cultural expressions, are guaranteed. No 
one may invoke the provisions of this Convention in order to 
infringe human rights and fundamental freedoms as enshrined in 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights or guaranteed by 
international law, or to limit the scope thereof. 
 
As argued above, the measures at issue might amount to violations of 
the right to freedom of expression under the ICCPR. Thus, the Convention 
might not be of much use to China after all. 
                                                        
63 Convention, supra note 53, art. 20.   
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III. WILL CHINA BACK OFF? 
In summary, legally speaking, China’s prospect of winning the case is 
rather bleak. Will China settle the case with the United States then? As 
discussed by the author in other articles, notwithstanding its initial 
reluctance to use the WTO dispute settlement system, China has managed 
to overcome its fear towards the system since last year.64 For example, in 
response to the U.S. complaint on TRIPS enforcement brought on the same 
day as the current case, vice-premier Wu Yi made the now-famous 
statement that “China will be willing to see the case through to the end” if 
necessary.65 Thus, it appears that China might not want to settle the case 
that easily. On the other hand, the legal weakness and political sensitivity 
surrounding the case make it a rather embarrassing and risky option for 
China to have the case openly litigated in the WTO. In China, the main 
agencies in charge of the censorship regime are the General Administration 
of Press and Publication, the State Administration of Radio, Film, and 
Television and the Central Propaganda Department. Even though they 
examine other people’s works everyday, they probably do not like the idea 
of having to be subject to the judgment by another body, especially when 
such body is an institution staffed by foreign-trained lawyers based in a 
foreign country. Also, as these agencies have little international exposure, 
their views on the relationship between the WTO obligations and national 
sovereignty are probably very different from the ones held by the Ministry 
of Commerce of the People's Republic of China (the “MOFCOM”). Even 
though the Central Propaganda Department is only an agency of the 
Communist Party rather than a formal ministry in the government, within 
the hierarchy of the domestic political system, the Central Propaganda 
Department carries more weight than the MOFCOM. This partly explains 
the silence of the Chinese government on this case so far: it could be the 
case that the MOFCOM is waiting for instructions from the Central 
Propaganda Department, or someone even higher up, while those people at 
the higher echelon really have no clue as to what should be done. 
On balance, to avoid public humiliation, China might try to work out a 
secret deal with the United States, granting U.S. firms the right to import 
and distribute the publications, while maintaining the censorship regime so 
that the contents of the imported publications would still have to be 
                                                        
64 Compare Henry Gao, Aggressive Legalism: The East Asian Experience and Lessons for China, 
in CHINA’S PARTICIPATION IN THE WTO 315-351 (Henry Gao and Donald Lewis eds., 2005); 
Henry Gao, China’s Participation in the WTO: A Lawyer’s Perspective, 11 SINGAPORE YEAR 
BOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1–34 (2007), and Henry Gao, Taming the Dragon: China’s 
Experience in WTO Dispute Settlement, 34(4) LEGAL ISSUES OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 369-92 
(2007).  
65  China Daily, Wu: US Piracy Case Will Harm Trade Ties, Apr. 24, 2007, available at 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-04/24/content_858638.htm.  
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examined and approved before being introduced into the stream of 
commerce. It is very likely that the United States would welcome such 
move as well. Legally speaking, the United States has every right to force 
the case to go all the way before the Panel and the Appellate Body. 
However, this is probably not an attractive option for the United States: 
even if China does lose the case, it can always follow the example of the 
United States in the Gambling case and just revise its schedule to create an 
exception for distribution services on publications and movies.66 Of course, 
China would have to offer compensations in such case, but the United 
States still would not be able to crack open the lucrative market for the 
distribution of publications and movies. From the perspective of 
maximizing commercial benefits, the U.S. government, and the big 
corporate interests behind it, are more interested in selling more copies of 
the “Red Dragon” rather than really wanting to pressure China to lift the 
ban on the “Red Corner”.67  
While many people might find such an outcome somewhat unexciting, 
we have to keep in mind that there is only so much the WTO, an 
organization with the primary mandate to liberalize trade, could do to help 
make the world a better place.  
What is the morale of this latest episode of never-ending trade disputes? 
The pen may be mightier than sword, but it is not as powerful as the 
hammer and sickle, especially if the latter has the backing of the almighty 
dollar.  
                                                        
66 USTR, Statement of Deputy United States Trade Representative John K. Veroneau Regarding 
U.S. Actions under GATS Article XXI, May 4 2007, available at http://www.ustr.gov/ 
Document_Library/Press_Releases/2007/May/Statement_of_Deputy_United_States_Trade_Repres
entative_John_K_Veroneau_Regarding_US_Actions_under_GATS_Article_XXI.html.  
67 “Red Corner” (1997) is a movie about the criminal justice system in China. It has been banned 
in China. See http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0119994/.  
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